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COMMENTS
WHAT AN ARBITRATOR SHOULD
INVESTIGATE AND DISCLOSE:
PROPOSING A NEW TEST FOR
EVIDENT PARTIALITY UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT'
INTRODUCTION
Parties to commercial disputes commonly resort to binding
arbitration as an alternative to litigating disagreements. Over the
last several decades, American companies have increasingly used
arbitration to resolve legal issues because of the numerous per-
ceived benefits of this dispute resolution process.2 These benefits
include expedience, the reduced costs that can be realized by
avoiding protracted court battles, and the fact that arbitrators often
have unique expertise and knowledge about certain industry or
business-specific matters that make them preferable to a judge or
jury. Additionally, parties to a disagreement frequently look to
arbitration for its finality, since an arbitration award creates fewer
grounds for judicial review than does typical litigation.3
Despite the sense of finality associated with arbitration, the
losing party will frequently look for ways of vacating the arbitra-
tion award. One common means of challenging an arbitration
award is for the losing party to claim that a supposedly neutral ar-
bitrator was partial to the other party in the dispute. The premise
for claims of such partiality can vary, but one prevalent argument
asserted by parties seeking to vacate an arbitration award is that
the arbitrator should have been disqualified from hearing the mat-
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
2 See DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE USE OF ADR IN U.S. CORPORATIONS
1 (1998); LUCILLE M. PONTE & THOMAS D. CAVENAGH, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN BUSINESS 159 (1999).
1 See JOHN W. COOLEY & STEVEN LUBET, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY 5-6 (1997);
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 234 (1999).
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ter because a conflict of interest existed. Examples of such con-
flicts are numerous and can include situations where an arbitrator
has prior or current financial dealings with a party to the arbitra-
tion, an employee of a party to the arbitration, counsel for a party
to the arbitration, or a witness who appears during the course of
the arbitration. Additionally, an arbitrator can have potential con-
flicts that stem from family relationships or social contacts with
the disputants. Attorneys or businesspeople may also face con-
flicts based on current or past professional associates having deal-
ings with the parties to the arbitration.4
If the arbitrator does not disclose such a conflict in a timely
manner, 5 the losing party can then assert that "evident partiality"
on the arbitrator's part warrants vacating the arbitration award un-
der the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).6 Displeased parties will
often conduct thorough background investigations following the
arbitration award for the sole purpose of uncovering just such an
undisclosed conflict that might allow for a successful challenge to
the arbitration decision. The question then arises as to what spe-
cific types of conflict of interest are so serious as to warrant judi-
cial intervention and the vacating of an arbitration award that
would otherwise be considered binding and final.
Courts have struggled to define a standard for evaluating
which undisclosed conflicts amount to evident partiality and which
are merely oversights by an arbitrator who failed to notify the par-
ties of some highly tenuous connection not meriting disqualifica-
tion. Furthermore, courts have provided little help in developing a
framework for determining what specific types of conflicts are
highly suggestive of bias. The law gets even murkier when con-
sidering whether an arbitrator has a duty to investigate potential
conflicts of interest prior to hearing a case. Questions linger as to
whether an arbitrator can be evidently partial to a party, based on
an undisclosed conflict of interest, if the arbitrator never even had
knowledge that the conflict of interest existed.
4 See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Setting Aside Arbitration Award on Ground
of Interest or Bias of Arbitrators - Commercial, Business, or Real Estate Transactions, 67
A.L.R. 5th 179 (1999) (discussing the plethora of scenarios upon which arbitration awards are
challenged); Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of§ IO(a)(1)-(3)
of Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. § J0(a)(J)-(3)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration
Awards Where Award Procured by Fraud, Corruption, or Undue Means, Where Arbitrators
Evidence Partiality or Corruption and Where Arbitrators Engage in Particular Acts of Misbe-
havior, 141 A.L.R. FED. 1 (1997) (summarizing the myriad of cases on this topic).
5 Once a conflict is disclosed, if neither party objects to the arbitrator's continued service
upon agreement that the conflict is trivial, then any later claim of bias will have been waived.
See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
6 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000). This section permits a court to vacate an arbitration award
"where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them." Id.
[Vol. 53:815
2003] PROPOSING A NEW TEST FOR EVIDENT IMPARTIALITY 817
This Comment will address these various issues and attempt
to bring some uniformity to a myriad of inconsistent judicial rul-
ings, specifically in the context of commercial arbitration.7 This
Comment will argue that arbitrators should be encouraged, but not
legally compelled, to follow the general guidelines regarding in-
vestigation and disclosure promulgated by arbitration-related or-
ganizations. To then prove evident partiality under the FAA, the
law should only require a party to demonstrate that an undisclosed
conflict of interest creates a reasonable impression of partiality.
Assuming a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award can dem-
onstrate evident partiality, this Comment will propose a new af-
firmative defense whereby the party seeking to maintain an arbitra-
tion award can have the award upheld by showing that the arbitra-
tor made a reasonable investigation of potential conflicts and had
no knowledge of the conflict at issue.
Part I will discuss the increasing use of arbitration, the per-
ceived benefits of this dispute resolution process, and the general
guidelines regarding arbitrator disclosures, investigations, and dis-
qualifications. Part II will examine prior judicial decisions that
have reviewed arbitration awards for evident partiality based on
undisclosed conflicts of interest, the standards for evaluating such
claims that have been enunciated, and decisions that have touched
on arbitrator knowledge and the duty to investigate. Part III will
propose a new test for evaluating evident partiality claims that in-
corporates the issues surrounding arbitrator knowledge and inves-
tigations, while providing a clearer framework for gauging the im-
portance or triviality of potential conflicts.
I. ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Increasing Use of Arbitration
Commercial arbitration has been around for centuries, as it
"antedated the American Revolution in New York and several
other colonies and is widely used today."8 According to a recent
study of arbitration use, 79% of U.S. corporations had utilized ar-
bitration in the prior three years to settle disagreements. 9 Looking
at a full range of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques,
7 The arguments in this Comment relate specifically to undisclosed conflicts of interest
between a neutral arbitrator and a party to the arbitration in the context of commercial arbitra-
tion disputes governed by the American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules.
Different arguments would certainly apply to party-appointed arbitrators, in labor arbitrations,
or if the parties agreed to have a different set of procedural rules govern their arbitration.
8 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 233.
9 LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 2, at 1.
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the study found that a majority of companies viewed ADR as an
essential tool to control costs and "improve their ability to manage
disputes."' 10 Furthermore, from 1986 to 1991 the American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA), the leading provider of arbitration-
related services and guidelines, saw a 34% increase in arbitration
filings. In 1991, there were 62,000 arbitration cases filed that
sought damages amounting to more than $4.5 billion.1 Such an
increase in the popularity of arbitration is hardly surprising, given
the numerous perceived benefits of this dispute resolution process.
The advantages of arbitration versus litigation include having
a decision maker with specialized knowledge, the generally limited
means of appealing arbitration awards, the fact that arbitration is a
private dispute resolution forum, "procedural informality," re-
duced costs, and the relative expedience of the process.' 2 Arbitra-
tion, however, has numerous perceived drawbacks, "includ[ing]
the lack of public norms, the lack of binding precedent, insuffi-
cient opportunity for full discovery, relaxed rules of evidence,
usually no written reasons for decisions, no uniformity of deci-
sions, and usually no opportunity for appeal."'
13
B. The Arbitration Process
Commercial arbitration is typically initiated because of a pro-
vision in an existing agreement or because the parties mutually
agree that arbitrating their dispute is more desirable than litigating
the dispute. Agreements to arbitrate are enforceable based on pro-
0 Id. at 5-6.
11 PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 159; see also Stephanie Armour, Mandatory
Arbitration: A Pill Many are Forced to Swallow, USA TODAY, July 9, 1998, at Al (finding that
from 1991 to 1998, the AAA went from handling cases "for a few dozen companies" to
"serv[ing] about 350 firms employing 4 million workers covered by both mandatory and volun-
tary arbitration clauses"). Much of the increase in arbitration is due to clauses in employment
agreements and in corporate agreements with consumers. Although the benefits of commercial
arbitration voluntarily entered into by two companies with virtually equal bargaining power are
generally conceded, these benefits may not accrue to individuals in an arbitration setting. See
PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 1-3, 27 (2002) (noting the added expense for
individuals who arbitrate rather than litigate, while business-to-business arbitrations may save
money for the parties); Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209 (finding that dispute resolution costs, as com-
pared to litigation, are minimized when parties with equal bargaining power jointly agree to
submit a disagreement to arbitration); Armour, supra (discussing mandatory labor arbitrations
and noting that "[c]ritics say companies have found the gilded loophole for escaping costly jury
awards"). Therefore, this Comment focuses largely on commercial arbitration as the resulting
benefits are more visible.
12 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 234.
13 COOLEY & LUBET, supra note 3, at 7; see also id. at 5-9 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of litigation, arbitration, and mediation).
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visions in the FAA and state arbitration laws. 14 The first arbitra-
tion statute was passed in New York in 1920, and this statute
served as the impetus for the United States Arbitration Act that
was passed in 1925 (now known as the FAA).' 5 The FAA "pro-
moted the use of arbitration to resolve conflicts involving com-.... . ,16
mercial transactions among businesses in different states. The
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), 17 providing a model law for the
states, was also premised on the New York statute, and today
every state has some form of arbitration statute that generally mir-
rors the UAA and FAA.18 "The FAA displaces state law in the
state courts to the extent that state law conflicts with the goals or
policies of the [FAA]."' 9
Parties to arbitration commonly employ either a for-profit or
nonprofit organization to provide arbitration services. These ser-
vices can range from merely providing a standard set of rules and
guidelines to govern the arbitration proceedings, to a physical lo-
cation to conduct the arbitration, to providing neutral arbitrators
and overseeing the entire arbitration process. 20  The most well
known organization is the AAA which has developed its own rules
to govern commercial arbitrations. Parties, however, are free to
develop their own rules by contract, or adopt some or all of the
AAA rules prior to the inception of the arbitration proceedings.
21
"It is common for arbitration clauses to provide that AAA rules
will be followed.,
22
The selection of neutral arbitrators is often done with the as-
sistance of organizations like AAA unless an arbitration agreement
specifically delineates another method. 23 "In order to provide dis-
puting parties with qualified arbitrators, AAA ... maintain[s] arbi-
tration panels composed of approved arbitrators. 24 These arbitra-
tors are often "lawyers, business people, professors, or other per-
14 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 235 ("There is a strong public policy in favor of
arbitration as a means of relieving court congestion, and both federal and state courts will inter-
pret agreements to arbitrate broadly and exceptions narrowly.").
15 PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 158.
16 Id.
17 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1955).
18 PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 158-59; see also George Chamberlin, Cause of
Action to Vacate Arbitration Award on Ground of Partiality or Misconduct of Arbitrator, 25
CAUSES OF ACTION 473 (providing a table of all state statutes relating to arbitration agree-
ments).
19 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 235.
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sons familiar with the business or industry in which a dispute may
arise. 25 A list of these arbitrators and brief biographies on each
candidate are sent to the parties. The parties then rank their prefer-
ences and strike the names of arbitrators who they deem unaccept-
able to preside over the matter. 26 "The AAA will send a second
list in substantial cases if the parties cannot select a full panel from
the first one. 27
Once the arbitrators are in place, the proceeding can begin.
Procedural rules are normally governed by AAA rules or some
other prescribed guidelines. Although the parties are free to con-
tract otherwise, a typical dispute has only limited pre-arbitration
discovery, as is allowed by the arbitrator.28 The hearings are more
informal than litigation, and "the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied., 2 9 The parties will also mutually agree on the "objective
standards on which the arbitrator's decision is to be based., 30 Ad-
ditionally, in commercial arbitration the final ruling will often only
contain the arbitration award, as "commercial arbitrators do not
provide reasons for their decisions." 3'
When an award is handed down, parties are not legally bound
to comply with the decision. Thus, the victorious party in an arbi-
tration can seek judicial confirmation of the award under the FAA
if the losing party fails to comply. 32 This relatively straightfor-
ward process will normally result in a judgment confirming the
award, and this "has the same force and effect as any other judg-
ment., 33 Failure to comply can then result in judicially imposed
sanctions. 34  Alternatively, the losing party can seek to vacate
based on several statutory and non-statutory grounds. 35 The statu-
tory basis for vacating an arbitration award is found in section 10
of the FAA.36 Section 10(a) provides that "the United States court
in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
25 Id,
26 See PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 172.
27 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990S 30 (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991).
28 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 233-36.
29 Id. at 234.
30 Id.
3' Id.; see also PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 173.
32 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 235-36.
13 COOLEY & LUBET, supra note 3, at 211; see also id. at 210-12 (detailing the various
means by which arbitration awards can be enforced and challenged).
34 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 235.
35 See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commer-
cial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996) (explaining the various statutory and non-
statutory means by which courts have vacated arbitration awards).
16 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
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arbitration ... [w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them." 37  Awards are vacated under
Section 10 in only "approximately 10% of the instances in which
they have been challenged. 38
C. Guidelines for Arbitrators
The FAA does not provide any standards for arbitrators' con-
duct.39  Thus, any requirement that an arbitrator disclose poten-
tially disqualifying conflicts of interest or conduct an investigation
to uncover such conflicts stems from case law and suggested
guidelines by organizations within the field of arbitration. It is
widely recognized, however, that "[o]ne of the primary ethical du-
ties of arbitrators is to avoid any appearance of bias due to previ-
ous or ongoing relationships with the parties, their attorneys, or
witnesses. Such relationships would be deemed a conflict of inter-
est." 40 Therefore, arbitrators should "disclose to the parties any
financial, business, professional, social, or familiar relationship
that may affect their impartiality.'
When learning of such a relationship, an arbitrator should ei-
ther voluntarily withdraw or disclose the conflict to the parties and
assert a belief that despite the relationship the proceedings would
still be conducted impartially. If either party objects to the contin-
ued service of the arbitrator, the arbitrator should then either with-
draw or, in AAA proceedings, allow the organization to determine
whether the arbitrator can continue to serve. 2 If both parties do
agree to the continued service of the arbitrator, any later claim of
partiality based on the conflict at issue would be waived. 3
Rule 19 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules deals spe-
cifically with neutral arbitrator disclosures and challenges to that
arbitrator's continued service.44 Although Rule 19 does not re-
37 Id. at § 10(a)(2).
38 Campbell, supra note 4, at § 2[a]. "The most frequent ground for vacating arbitration
awards is that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers, permitting the vacating of the award
under § 10(a)(4)." Id.
39 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
40 PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 174.
41 Id.
42 See JOHN W. COOLEY, THE ARBITRATOR'S HANDBOOK 36-37 (1998) (providing a
detailed list for arbitrators to consult to determine if potential conflicts exist).
43 See, e.g., Cook Indus., Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 449 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that a
party "cannot remain silent, raising no objection during the course of the arbitration proceeding,
and when an award adverse to him has been handed down complain of a situation of which he
had knowledge"); Campbell, supra note 4, at § 16 (discussing how an objection to an arbitra-
tor's continued service is waived if the objection is not asserted in a timely manner).
44 AM. ARB. ASS'N COMMERCIAL ARB. R. 19 (1999). The full text states that:
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quire the disclosure of every possible connection the arbitrator
may have with the parties, arbitrators are required to disclose "any
circumstance likely to affect impartiality or independence, includ-
ing any bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the
arbitration or any past or present relationship with the parties or
their representatives, 45 no matter how tenuous. Failure to disclose
such a conflict might give rise to a strong claim for vacating an
arbitration award based on evident partiality, but such an omission
would certainly not be dispositive. This is merely an AAA rule, so
it is not a lawfully imposed condition arbitrators must follow under
the FAA. An arbitrator can fail to make such a disclosure and still
not be found to have demonstrated evident partiality.46
Also providing guidance for arbitrators is the Code of Ethics
for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (Code of Ethics), promul-
gated by the American Bar Association and the AAA.47 Canon II
requires arbitrators to disclose any "financial or personal interest
in the outcome of the arbitration," as well as business, profes-
sional, familiar, or social relationships with any party, counsel, or
witness that might impugn their own impartiality.48 The Code of
Ethics, however, notes that "[t]hese provisions ... are intended to
(a) Any person appointed as a neutral arbitrator shall disclose to the
AAA any circumstance likely to affect impartiality or independence, in-
cluding any bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the
arbitration or any past or present relationship with the parties or their
representatives. Upon receipt of such information from the arbitrator or
another source, the AAA shall communicate the information to the par-
ties, and if it deems it appropriate to do so, to the arbitrator and others.
(b) Upon objection of a party to the continued service of a neutral arbi-
trator, the AAA shall determine whether the arbitrator should be dis-
qualified and shall inform the parties of its decision, which shall be con-
clusive.
Id. The AAA also asks that neutral arbitrators sign a disclosure statement prior to presid-
ing over a dispute that acknowledges the importance of full and complete disclosure. See
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990s, supra note 27, at 36 (providing text of the disclo-
sure statement).
45 AM. ARB. ASS'N COMMERCIAL ARB. R. 19(a) (1999).
46 See, e.g., ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 499 (4th Cir. 1999)
(finding that "[w]hen parties agree to be bound by the AAA rules, those rules do not give a
federal court license to vacate an award on grounds other than those set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10"
and that when "determining whether to set aside an arbitration award, a court may only consider
whether the complaining party has demonstrated a violation of the governing statute"); Merit
Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Although we have great
respect for the Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, they are
not the proper starting point for an inquiry into an award's validity under section 10 of the [Fed-
eral] Arbitration Act."); Transit Cas. Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., 659 F. Supp. 1346, 1353
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[A] federal court may overturn an arbitration award only if the moving
party proves one of the grounds enumerated in the Arbitration Act or shows that the panel disre-
garded the law. At the outside, were the violations of AAA guidelines clear cut, they might be
relevant to issues of misconduct.").
47 See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977).
48 Id. at Canon II-A.
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be applied realistically so that the burden of detailed disclosure
does not become so great that it is impractical for persons in the
business world to be arbitrators. 49 Such application would "de-
priv[e] parties of the services of those who might be best informed
and qualified to decide particular types of cases."5 °
The Code of Ethics diverges from the AAA Rules by impos-
ing an affirmative duty to investigate on arbitrators. "Persons who
are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should make a
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or relation-
ships [required to be disclosed]." 5' Failure to comply with these
ethical guidelines, however, does not automatically create a viable
cause of action for evident partiality under the FAA. This is be-
cause the Preamble to the Code of Ethics states that "[v]arious as-
pects of the conduct of arbitrators ... may be governed by ... ap-
plicable law. This code does not take the place of or supersede
such ... laws and does not establish new or additional grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards." 52
While the UAA is silent on arbitrator disclosure,53 the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) promulgated in 2000 closely
follows the Code of Ethics. 54 Section 12 of the RUAA requires
disclosures based on similar criteria as the AAA rules and the
Code of Ethics. An arbitrator need not disclose every trivial con-
nection to the parties to the dispute. But an arbitrator, "after mak-
ing a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose ... any known facts that a
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality
of the arbitrator., 55 Thus, an arbitrator under the RUAA must in-
vestigate and disclose any reasonable known conflict. 56 As with the
other guidelines previously discussed, failure to comply with the
RUAA through a lack of investigation or through nondisclosure
does not automatically demonstrate evident partiality under the
FAA, as these are all mere guidelines for an arbitrator to follow.
49 Id. at Canon 11, introductory n.
50 Id.
51 Id. at Canon 1-B. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code of
Arbitration Procedure also imposes a duty to investigate on arbitrators. See Louis F. Burke,
Standards for Arbitrator Recusal, 1326 PLI/CORI' 889, 894 (2002) (discussing Rule 10312(b) of
the NASD arbitration rules where the language mirrors the investigation requirement found in
the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes).
52 CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Preamble (1977).
53 See UNIF. ARB. ACT §§ 1-25 (1955).
54 See REVISED UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12 (2000).
55 Id. at § 12(a).
56 While an arbitrator must make a "reasonable inquiry" under section 12, "[t]he extent of
this inquiry may depend upon the circumstances of the situation and the custom in a particular
industry. ... Once an arbitrator has made a 'reasonable inquiry' ... the arbitrator will be re-
quired to disclose only 'known facts' that might affect impartiality." Id. at § 12 cmt. 3.
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
A. What Constitutes Evident Partiality Warranting Vacating an
Arbitration Award?
1. The Commonwealth Coatings Decision
The Supreme Court issued the seminal decision involving va-
cating an arbitration award based on an undisclosed conflict of in-
terest in 1968. In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co. ,57 the Court vacated an arbitration award based on an
undisclosed prior business relationship between a supposedly neu-
tral arbitrator and the victorious party in the matter.5 The arbitra-
tor had served as an engineering consultant for the party and had
been paid about $12,000 over several years. 59 Although the arbi-
trator had not worked for the party within the previous year, "the
relationship even went so far as to include the rendering of ser-
vices on the very projects involved in this [arbitration]." 60
Writing for the majority, Justice Black sought to impose the
same ethical standards on arbitrators as are faced by judges. 61 Jus-
tice Black stated that arbitrators should "disclose to the parties any
dealings that might create an impression of possible bias." 62 He
then held that for an arbitration award not to be vacated for evident
partiality under the FAA based on an undisclosed conflict of inter-
est, the arbitrator "not only must be unbiased but also must avoid
even the appearance of bias. 6 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice White stated that "[t]he Court
does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the stan-
dards ofjudicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any
judges." Justice White also wrote that arbitrators should not be
automatically disqualified based on an undisclosed relationship if
"the relationship is trivial., 65 He then continued by discussing the
57 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
58 Id. at 146-48.
59 Id. at 146.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 146-50.
62 Id. at 149.
63 Id. at 150. The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears the burden of proof.
See, e.g., ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999); Woods v.
Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424,427 (9th Cir. 1996).
64 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
joined in the concurring opinion. Id.
65 Id.
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need for early and full disclosure to maintain the integrity of the
arbitration process. 66 Justice White continued by stating that:
an arbitrator's business relationships may be diverse indeed,
involving more or less remote connections with great num-
bers of people. He cannot be expected to provide the parties
his complete and unexpurgated business biography. But it is
enough for present purposes to hold, as the Court does, that
where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which
has done more than trivial business with a party, that fact
must be disclosed. If arbitrators err on the side of disclosure,
as they should, it will not be difficult for courts to identify
those undisclosed relationships which are too insubstantial to
warrant vacating an award.67
Both this concurrence and Justice Black's opinion, however,
fail to define a clear standard as to specific types of relationships
that will generally constitute evident partiality if undisclosed.68
"Federal courts have struggled over the meaning and application of
Commonwealth Coatings, principally because of the unusual na-
ture of Justice White's concurrence in which he purported to join
the majority opinion while delimiting its application., 69  In fact,
Justice White wrote "[w]hile I am glad to join my Brother Black's
opinion in this case, I desire to make these additional remarks. 7 °
Consequently, some courts have looked to Justice Black's opinion
as authoritative while other courts have adopted Justice White's
concurrence, as his concurrence was necessary to comprise a ma-
jority of the court.7 1 Courts that evaluate evident partiality based
on Black's "appearance of bias" standard typically manage to rec-
66 Id. at 150-52.
67 Id. at 151-52.
68 Id. at 145-52. For example, the opinions fail to discuss whether family or social con-
tacts could give rise to a conflict warranting the vacating of an arbitration award. Furthermore,
the court does not opine on how recent business contacts must be or how sizable a financial
connection must be to suggest potential bias. Courts examining these issues have largely taken a
case-by-case, fact specific approach.
69 Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Serv. Corp., 751 A.2d 426, 434 (Del. Ch.
1999); see also Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir.
1995) ("[T]here is some uncertainty among the courts of appeals about the holding of Com-
monwealth Coatings."); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding the Commonwealth Coatings decision of little value "because of the inability of a ma-
jority of the Justices to agree on anything but the result").
70 Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
71 See ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 499 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999)
(noting the weight that has been given to Justice White's concurring opinion); Morelite Constr.
Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 n.3 (2d Cir.
1984) ("[W]e must narrow the holding to that subscribed to by both Justices White and
Black."); Merit, 714 F.2d at 682 (stating that courts in the Seventh Circuit have looked to Justice
White's opinion).
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oncile the two opinions, whereas courts that adopt a more stringent
standard justify it because Justice White narrowed Black's deci-
sion and his concurrence was needed to form a majority of the
Court .2
2. Other Courts
Courts have struggled to interpret the Commonwealth Coat-
ings standard for overturning an arbitration award and in develop-
ing a framework for determining what types of conflicts are so
egregious that those awards should be vacated. As for the various
standards that have been enunciated, courts have not required ac-
tual proof of bias in nondisclosure cases.73 Courts have, however,
taken varied approaches that range from Justice Black's "appear-
ance of bias" standard to requiring a party to "demonstrate 'that a
reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was
partial to the other party to the arbitration.' '' 74  Some courts have
employed standards requiring "a party seeking vacatur [to] put
forward facts that objectively demonstrate such a degree of partial-
ity that a reasonable person could assume that the arbitrator had
improper motives. 75 Other decisions have found evident partiality
to be "present when undisclosed facts show 'a reasonable impres-
sion of partiality"' 76 and where an "arbitrator knows of, but fails to
disclose, information which would lead a reasonable person to be-
lieve that a potential conflict exists. 77 These various standards
suggest just how much courts have struggled in interpreting the
Commonwealth Coatings decision.
Aside from failing to define a clear standard for evaluating
claims of evident partiality, courts have also struggled to generate
guidelines for determining what types of relationships and how
72 Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1994) (reconciling the
opinions and following the "appearance of bias" approach), with Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83-84
(looking to the Justice White's concurring opinion and adopting a standard more stringent than
an "appearance of bias" but short of requiring proof of actual bias).
73 See Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing
the burden of proof in nondisclosure cases as being at a lower threshold than proof of actual bias
which is needed when actual bias is asserted); Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84 (discussing how it is
nearly impossible to prove actual bias).
74 ANR, 173 F.3d at 500 (citing Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, UAW, 48 F.3d
125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995)); see also Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir.
2001) ("The absence of a consensus on the meaning of 'evident partiality' is evidenced by the
approach adopted by the different circuits.").
75 ANR, 173 F.3d at 501; see also AI-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (finding an "onerous standard for vacatur").
76 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1046 (citing Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197,
1201 (11th Cir. 1982)).
77 Gianelli Money Purchase Plan and Trust v. ADM Investor Serv., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309,
1312 (11th Cir. 1998).
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proximate connections must be to warrant vacating an arbitration
award.78 The following undisclosed relationships have not war-
ranted the vacation of an arbitration award:79 where an arbitrator's
law firm represented a primary customer of a party to the arbitra-
tion on matters similar to the arbitration; 80 where an arbitrator,
Nichols, failed to disclose that a witness for and employee of one
party was himself "serving as an arbitrator in a number of arbitra-
tions that involved Nichols' employer; ' 81 where an arbitrator who
was also an attorney had a disagreement with a lawyer from a
party's law firm eighteen months prior to the arbitration; 82 where
an arbitrator's former law firm had previously represented a party
to the arbitration on unrelated matters; 83 where fourteen years prior
to the arbitration the president of one party and a key witness in
the arbitration proceedings had served as the arbitrator's supervi-
sor;84 where an arbitrator and a party's expert witness "were lim-
ited partners in a partnership that owned an apartment complex;, 85
where an arbitrator had recently arbitrated a identical matter for a
party, resolving that issue in the party's favor; 86 where an arbitra-
tor had a stock interest in a company whose subsidiary owned a
small portion a party to the arbitration; 87 and where an arbitrator's
law firm represented companies that had the same parent company
as a party to the arbitration.88
Conversely, the following undisclosed relationships have war-
ranted vacating an arbitration award: where an arbitrator had done
consulting work for a party and received $12,000 over the past
78 Courts typically take a case-by-case, fact specific approach rather than employ per se
rules. See, e.g., id. at 1312 ("Whether these conditions [suggesting partiality) have been met
ordinarily requires a fact-intensive inquiry."); Morelite, 748 F.2d at 85 ("We need not, and do
not, attempt to set forth a list of familial or other relationships that will result in the per se vaca-
tion of an arbitration award, except to suggest that such a list would most likely be very short.");
Federal Vending, Inc. v. Steak & Ale, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
("[E]vident partiality is a fact-intensive, case-specific issue.").
79 For a thorough review of cases dealing with all types of undisclosed conflicts, see
Blum, supra note 4 and Campbell, supra note 4. These challenges are usually unsuccessful. See
supra text accompanying note 38.
80 ANR, 173 F.3d at 501-02.
81 Sofia Shipping Co. v. Amoco Transp. Co., 628 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
82 Lifecare Int'l. Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429,433-34 (11 th Cir. 1995).
83 Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680,682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
84 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 676-83 (7th Cir. 1983).
85 Apusento Garden Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Guam, 94 F.3d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1996).
86 Federal Vending, Inc. v. Steak & Ale, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249-51 (S.D. Fla.
1999).
87 Transit Cas. Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., 659 F. Supp. 1346, 1350-53 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
88 Evans Indus., v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 01-1546, 2001 WL 803772, at *3-5
(E.D. La. July 12, 2001).
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several years; 89 where an arbitrator had an ongoing legal dispute
with a party to the arbitration; 90 where an arbitrator's law firm had
represented the parent company of a party to the arbitration in nu-
merous matters; 1 where an arbitrator's father was an officer of an
international union, the local chapter of which was a party to the
dispute;92 where an arbitrator was a high ranking officer in a com-
pany that had substantial business dealings with a party to the arbi-
tration, even though the arbitrator was not personally involved in
those transactions; 93 where an arbitrator's law firm currently repre-
sented a party to the arbitration in other matters;94 and where coun-
sel for a party to an arbitration was simultaneously representing
the arbitrator in an unrelated matter.
95
Ultimately, there have been hundreds of decisions relating to
evident partiality and undisclosed conflicts of interest, often along
similar fact patterns, that have generated a myriad of differing re-
sults. 96 To develop some basis for its conclusion, the Fourth Cir-
cuit in ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.9 7 devel-
oped a set of four guidelines to serve as a framework for evaluat-
ing such claims. These guidelines include evaluating:
(1) the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuni-
ary or otherwise, of the arbitrator in the proceeding; (2) the
directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and the
party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that rela-
tionship to the arbitration; and (4) the proximity in time be-
tween the relationship and the arbitration proceeding.
98
The ANR decision further delineated that "[w]hen evaluating
each factor, the court should determine whether the asserted bias is
89 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146-50 (1968).
90 Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1199-1202 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
91 Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1044-49 (9th Cir. 1994); see also HSMV Corp. v.
ADI Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127-30 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (overturning an arbitration award
where the Australian government was party to arbitration and was also represented by arbitra-
tor's law firm).
92 Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748
F.2d 79, 82-85 (2d Cir. 1984).
93 Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 158-60 (8th Cir.
1995).
94 Close v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275, 1277-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
95 Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Services Corp., 751 A.2d 426, 431-42 (Del. Ch.
1999).
96 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
97 173 F.3d 493 (4" Cir. 1999).
91 Id. (citing Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, UAW, 48 F.3d 125, 130 (4th Cir.
1995)).
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'direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote,
uncertain or speculative ... 99
B. Is There a Duty to Investigate or a Knowledge Requirement?
While the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules do not discuss
the need for arbitrators to investigate whether there are potential
conflicts of interest, both the Code of Ethics and the RUAA im-
pose on an arbitrator a duty to investigate. As previously men-
tioned, however, this duty is merely a guideline and has not been
interpreted as a legal obligation meriting vacation of an arbitration
award if not followed.'0° Closely related to the issue of whether an
arbitrator has an affirmative duty to investigate potential conflicts
is whether an arbitrator must have actual knowledge of a conflict
for a court to vacate an award.' 0 If an arbitrator is unaware of a
conflict, an arbitrator conceivably could never be biased. On these
questions there is no consensus, as courts interpreting these issues
have issued a string of conflicting decisions.
One of the earliest federal cases holding that an arbitrator
must investigate potential conflicts was Schmitz v. Zilveti.10 2 In
Schmitz, a securities dispute was arbitrated according to the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers arbitration rules.10 3 These
rules closely mirror the Code of Ethics by imposing certain disclo-
sure obligations and requiring that arbitrators "'make a reasonable
effort to inform themselves of any [conflicts that must be dis-
closed]."' 4 The arbitrator in Schmitz failed to disclose that his
law firm had represented the parent company of a party to the arbi-
tration in numerous matters over several decades. Furthermore,
the arbitrator had actually seen documents noting the connection
between the party and the parent company. The arbitrator, how-
ever, only ran a conflict check under the name of the party to the
arbitration and not the parent company.10 5
The Schmitz court held that, even though there was no proof
the arbitrator was aware of the conflict, he had also failed to make
a reasonable investigation. 106 "Though lack of knowledge may
prohibit actual bias, it does not always prohibit a reasonable im-
99 Id. at 500 (citing Consolidation Coal, 48 F.3d at 129).
100 See supra Part I.C.
101 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
102 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
103 Id. at 1044.
104 Id. (citing NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 23(b)); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 51.
105 Id. at 1044.
106 Id. at 1048-49.
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pression of partiality.' ' 7  The court continued by noting that
"[r]equiring arbitrators to make investigations in certain circum-
stances gives arbitrators an incentive to be forthright with the par-
ties." 0 8 The court concluded that the conflict in question created a
reasonable appearance of bias, and even though the arbitrator had
no actual knowledge of the conflict, he did have constructive
knowledge. Furthermore, his failure to make a reasonable investi-
gation and disclose this conflict warranted vacating the arbitration
award. 109
State courts have also held there is a duty to investigate. In
Close v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company,1" an arbitration
award was vacated where the arbitrator's law firm represented a
party to the arbitration."' Although the arbitrator had no actual
knowledge of this conflict, the court found that the arbitrator knew
his firm often represented insurance companies, "he had access to
a client index[,] and [he received] weekly 'new client' notices
which would have alerted him to the conflict if he had consulted
them."' 12  The arbitrator commonly checked these sources when
taking on a new client, and the court held "that the same duty is
owed to the parties to an arbitration."' 13 The court concluded by
finding that the arbitrator had "constructive knowledge of the con-
flict and was under an obligation . . . under the AAA arbitration
rules ... to discover and disclose it.''
114
Similarly, based largely on the investigation requirement in
the Code of Ethics, the court in Beebe Medical Center, Inc. v. In-
Sight Health Services Corp. 115 held that an arbitrator must investi-
gate potential conflicts. By failing to disclose that counsel for a
party to the arbitration was also representing the arbitrator in a
separate matter, even though the arbitrator may have not known
that fact, the court found that this warranted the vacating of the
arbitrator's award. 16 The court stated that "[d]oubtless there are
costs to this strong pro-disclosure approach," but that the arbitrator
"had the duty and opportunity to obtain the necessary knowledge
107 Id. at 1048.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1048-49; accord HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 11 22, 1127-30 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (supporting the Schmitz ruling, finding a duty to investigate, and overturning an
arbitration award where the Australian government was party to arbitration and was also repre-
sented by arbitrator's law firm).
110 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 1277-79.
112 Id. at 1278.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1278-79.
"15 751 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1999).
116 Id. at 427-43.
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to make appropriate disclosure - and would appear to have had to
avoid reading important documents to remain in a state of igno-
rance."1
1 7
Despite this line of rulings, numerous federal courts have held
that an arbitrator has no duty to investigate. Furthermore, these
cases have implied that where an arbitrator has no knowledge of a
conflict, then there can be no possibility of bias." 8 Specifically,
the Schmitz decision was distinguished in Al-Harbi v. Citibank,
N.A." 9 based on the fact that Schmitz involved a securities dispute
conducted pursuant to securities arbitration rules that require an
arbitrator to investigate possible conflicts.' 20  The conflict in Al-
Harbi involved a situation where an arbitrator's prior law firm had
represented a party to the dispute on numerous unrelated matters.
The court held that "the fact that an arbitrator has not conducted an
investigation Sufficient to uncover the existence of facts margin-
ally disclosable under the Commonwealth Coatings duty is not suf-
ficient to warrant vacating an arbitration award for evident partial-
ity." 1
21
Similarly, the arbitrator in Lifecare International, Inc. v. CD
Medical, Inc. 122 failed to conduct an investigation adequate enough
to uncover the fact that his law firm had done limited work for a
party to the arbitration on matters related to the dispute over two
years before the arbitrator had actually joined his current firm. 21
The court found no evidence that the arbitrator had any knowledge
of this connection. 24 Furthermore, the court could not find that
the arbitrator's "failure to investigate and, of course, disclose the
two prior contacts between [the law firm] and CD Medical cre-
ate[d] a reasonable impression of bias or partiality."'
125
Given the divergent opinions by courts as to a knowledge re-
quirement and a duty to investigate, as well as the inability of the
17 ld. at 438.
118 "Some courts have considered an arbitrator's lack of knowledge as a factor in determin-
ing whether evident partiality was present." Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir.
1994); see also Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1199-1202 (11th Cir.
1982) (vacating an award based on an arbitrator's knowledge of an undisclosed conflict, but
implying that if it had been shown that the arbitrator truly had no knowledge, then no bias could
be found).
119 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
120 Id. at 682-83; accord Evans Indus. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 01-1546, 2001
WL 803772, at *5 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001) ("The Fifth Circuit has not adopted such a duty to
investigate, and a number of circuits have rejected such a rule.").
121 Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 683.
122 68 F.3d 429 (11 th Cir. 1995).
123 Id. at 433-35.
12 Id. at 434-35.
125 Id. at 434; accord Gianelli Money Purchase Plan and Trust v. ADM Investor Serv.,
Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (1lth Cir. 1998).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
courts to agree on a well-defined standard for evaluating evident
partiality claims, a new test that reconciles these various issues is a
necessity. The existing framework is fraught with inconsistency
and ambiguity. The current scheme needs to be reevaluated, as it
is precisely these ambiguities that encourage parties dissatisfied
with arbitration results to bring what are all too often frivolous
challenges. The lack of consensus as to what undisclosed conflicts
warrant the vacating of arbitration awards incentivises parties to
attack awards where clearly there is only a trivial relationship and
no bias exists. Although these challenges are often unsuccessful,
the mere fact that the standards are unclear gives hope to many
parties that their challenge may be upheld. These challenges drive
up the ultimate cost of arbitration, reduce the expedience of the
process, and promote a sense that arbitration may not be as binding
as the parties initially hoped. For all these reasons, a new test for
evaluating evident partiality claims under the FAA is needed, spe-
cifically in the context of commercial arbitrations governed by
AAA rules.
III. PROPOSING A NEW STANDARD FOR DETERMINING AN
ARBITRATOR'S EVIDENT PARTIALITY
A. No Legal Obligation to Adhere to Arbitration Guidelines
At the outset, it is important that neutral arbitrators be encour-
aged to follow the general guidelines prescribed by the AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rules, the Code of Ethics, and the
RUAA. 2 6 Accordingly, an arbitrator should conduct a reasonable
investigation and disclose any facts or circumstances that might
imply that a potential conflict of interest exists. Arbitrators should
not feel compelled to meticulously investigate every conceivable
relationship an arbitrator could possibly have with a party to the
arbitration stretching back over decades, but should only make an
investigation that is reasonable under the circumstances.1 27 There-
fore, an arbitrator can certainly be conscious of the time involved
in checking for potential conflicts of interest and the monetary
burden that is associated with this obligation. As such, a lawyer
serving as an arbitrator, for example, could make a reasonable in-
vestigation by performing a conflict check similar to that con-
126 See supra Part I.C.
127 See CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon I-B (1977)
(requiring arbitrators to "make a reasonable effort" at investigating possible conflicts); REVISED
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12(a) (2000) (placing a "reasonable inquiry" requirement on arbitrators).
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ducted within that attorney's law firm every time a new client is
taken on.128
Businesspeople less accustomed to performing conflict checks
should still take the time to review certain issues, such as whether
they have had "any professional or social relationship with counsel
for any party in this proceeding or the firms for which they
work." 1 29  Additionally, the businesspeople/arbitrators should
examine whether "[they], any member of [their] immediate family,
or any close social or business associate [have] been involved in
the last five years in a dispute involving the subject matter
contained in the case to which [they] are assigned" or whether
"[they] served as an expert witness or consultant to any party,
attorney, or witness, or other arbitrator identified in this case."' 3 °
Potential conflicts uncovered through this investigation
should normally be disclosed to both parties to the arbitration,
unless the relationship at issue is unquestionably trivial. Any rela-
tionship that could even remotely give rise to an impression of bias
should be disclosed. Spending several extra minutes to make full
disclosures to the parties prior to the beginning of arbitration pro-
ceedings is hardly as burdensome as the time and expense that will
later be incurred by the parties if a challenge can be maintained
based on an undisclosed conflict. "If arbitrators err on the side of
disclosure, as they should, it will not be difficult for courts to iden-
tify those undisclosed relationships which are too insubstantial to
warrant vacating an award."'
131
Under the test being proposed, it is important to note that the
obligations imposed on arbitrators to conduct an investigation and
make disclosures per the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Code of Ethics are merely guidelines. Arbitrators are not, nor
should they be, legally compelled under the FAA to follow these
guidelines. To state otherwise would create new legal standards
under the statute where the plain language of Congress contem-
plates no such obligations. Although a failure to investigate or
disclose a relationship might lend further support to a judicial find-
ing that an arbitrator's undisclosed conflict creates a reasonable
appearance of bias, thus warranting the vacating of an award, such
128 See REVISED UNIF. ARB. AcT § 12 cmt. 3 (2000) (discussing the making of a "reason-
able inquiry" and disclosing any "'known facts' that might affect impartiality," as well as meth-
ods by which lawyers might conduct a conflicts check).
129 CooLEY, supra note 42, at 37.
130 Id. There is an actual checklist for potential arbitrators to consult as part of an investiga-
tion to determine if any such conflict exists. Id. at 274.
13" Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
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failures cannot exclusively merit the overturning of an award. 132
Thus, there is no formal duty to investigate or disclose conflicts,
although investigations and disclosures should be encouraged.
B. What Party Seeking to Vacate Award Must Prove
1. A Reasonable Impression of Partiality
Courts have failed to reach a consensus on the standard to be
used when evaluating whether an undisclosed conflict of interest
amounts to evident partiality, while also failing to enunciate a
clear framework for gauging what types of conflicts would gener-
ally be highly suggestive of potential bias. The standards used by
courts can be viewed as a spectrum, where the Commonwealth
Coatings majority "appearance of bias" test presents a lower
threshold of proof, demonstrating actual bias presents the most
demanding burden of proof, and many courts have fallen some-
where in the middle by following Justice White's concurring opin-
ion. 13
3
Courts should adhere to a standard requiring that a party only
demonstrates that "undisclosed facts show 'a reasonable impres-
sion of partiality."",134 This standard, drawn from Justice Black's
majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, is more appropriate
because Justice White's concurrence "does not expressly reject the
'appearance of bias' language." 135 Justice White sought to assure
that arbitrators would not be held to the same standards as judges,
because arbitrators "are men of affairs, not apart from but of the
marketplace, that they are effective in their adjudicatory func-i ,36 ...
tion. Aside from this point, there is no clear evidence that Jus-
tice White actually sought to limit application of the "appearance
of bias" standard set forth in Justice Black's opinion.' 37
132 See supra note 46 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 52.
13- See supra Part II.A. The court in ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., for example,
looked to Justice White's concurrence and used a higher proof threshold that was just short of
requiring proof of actual bias. The court required a party to "demonstrate 'that a reasonable
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitra-
tion."' 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, UAW,
48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995)).
1.3 Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11 th Cir. 1982)). This test provides for a more "succinct
standard" and "is the best expression of the Commonwealth Coatings court's holding." Id. at
1047.
135 Id. at 1046.
136 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
137 The Schmitz court noted:
Arbitrators have many more potential conflicts of interest than judges.
In arbitration, moreover, only disclosure and not recusal is required.
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When countering a claim of evident partiality, a party seeking
to maintain an arbitration award has numerous arguments it can
make during this stage of the analysis. A party can assert that the
undisclosed relationship does not create a reasonable impression of
partiality, possibly because the challenged relationship was too
tenuous or was decades earlier. Thus, a party will argue that the
conflict was trivial and there was no need for disclosure. Alterna-
tively, a party can claim that the arbitrator did make a reasonable
disclosure of the contested relationship. If disclosure was made
then the party seeking to vacate the arbitration award may have
waived any right to challenge the arbitrator's partiality.1
38
This portion of the test for partiality should not examine
whether an arbitrator did investigate potential conflicts or whether
an arbitrator had actual knowledge of the undisclosed conflict in
question. The issues of arbitrator knowledge and investigations
will be discussed in Part III.C, but at this juncture in the analysis
they should not be considered by the courts. Thus, the initial test
for evident partiality should solely examine whether an undis-
closed conflict of interest creates a reasonable impression of parti-
ality, regardless of any investigation or arbitrator knowledge. Such
a finding would then result in the vacating of an arbitration
award. 3 9
2. The Four-Factor Framework
Courts should generally not have a predetermined set of rela-
tionships that automatically warrant the upholding or vacating of
arbitration awards. However, certain guidelines are necessary to
aid a court in determining whether an undisclosed conflict is so
severe as to create a reasonable impression of partiality. The
framework that should be employed is the four-factor test enunci-
ated by the court in ANR, as it provides clear and easy to apply
Given these differences, it is clear that the actual standard for arbitrators
does differ from that of judges, even though language used to describe
both standards may be similar. Justice White's rejection, in this context,
of the standard applicable to judges does not therefore require rejection
of language such as "appearance of bias," which might be used in other
contexts to describe that standard. Given Justice White's express adher-
ence to the majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, it is clear that
the majority opinion, including its "appearance of bias" language, re-
ceived at least five votes.
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1046-47.
138 See Chamberlin, supra note 18, at §§ 11-14 (discussing various defenses to claims of
evident partiality).
139 The vacating of the award, however, is still subject to the proposed new affirmative
defense discussed in Part III.C.
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guidelines allowing for a more straightforward analysis. 40 This
framework asks: (1) whether an arbitrator has a personal interest in
an arbitration and what precisely is that interest; (2) how tenuous
is the challenged relationship; (3) is the challenged relationship
connected to the arbitration; and (4) how recent or remote is the
challenged relationship. 141
Some or all of these factors may be relevant to a court's
analysis, but an undisclosed relationship need not register strong
conflicts across all these factors to be highly suggestive of bias.
For example, consider an arbitration where the key witness for a
party in the dispute is the arbitrator's former college roommate.
The entire dispute hinges on the credibility of this witness. Al-
though the arbitrator and the witness had not been in contact for
over twenty years, during college they were best of friends, and the
arbitrator firmly believes the witness was a pillar of trust and pos-
sessed terrific judgment, based on their past relationship. Perhaps
the arbitrator never disclosed the relationship because, upon re-
ceiving the witness list, the arbitrator failed to recognize the for-
mer roommate's name, as it had been changed following her mar-
riage. When the witness arrived to testify the arbitrator again
failed to disclose the relationship out of fear that it would disrupt
the flow of the proceedings and perhaps give the parties a sense
that the arbitrator might be partial to the party producing the col-
lege roommate as a witness.142
In this scenario, the arbitrator has no personal interest in the
arbitration, the connection is somewhat tenuous given this is not a
familial, business, or professional relationship, and the connection
between the arbitrator and the witness is certainly remote in time.
The challenged relationship, however, is tightly connected to the
arbitration proceedings because of the importance of this witness's
testimony and should have been disclosed. Failure to make such a
disclosure could give rise to a reasonable impression of partiality,
thus warranting the vacating the arbitration award. Therefore, no
one factor should dominate a court's analysis, but all these factors
must be examined within the totality of the factual scenario pre-
sented.
140 See ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999).
141 Id.
142 This example was loosely drawn from PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 2, at 171.
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C. The Proposed Affirmative Defense: Lack of Knowledge Based on
Reasonable Investigation
Assuming that a court has found that an arbitrator's undis-
closed conflict of interest constitutes evident partiality warranting
the vacating of an arbitration award, the burden would then shift to
the party seeking to maintain the arbitration award to successfully
assert this new affirmative defense. That party could rebut the
finding that the arbitrator was evidently partial by showing that the
arbitrator made a reasonable investigation of all facts and circum-
stances known to the arbitrator and had no knowledge of the con-
flict of interest that went undisclosed. 1
43
This new proposal for an affirmative defense would effec-
tively deal with the issues of arbitrator knowledge and investiga-
tion, and it would only be available in arbitration disputes where
the arbitrator performed a reasonable investigation. Parties that
select an arbitrator who has not complied with the Code of Ethics
and RUAA guidelines concerning conflict investigations could not
later avail themselves of this affirmative defense if the award was
overturned based on the arbitrator's evident partiality. Parties that
want the later availability of this affirmative defense will therefore
be encouraged to seek arbitrators that follow these arbitration
guidelines.
If a court has found that an undisclosed conflict creates a rea-
sonable impression of partiality and the arbitrator failed to conduct
a reasonable investigation, this affirmative defense would not be
available even if it appeared the arbitrator had no knowledge of the
conflict. A lack of knowledge would only serve as an affirmative
defense if a reasonable investigation were conducted. Although
this might produce some harsh results, it also prevents arbitrators
from intentionally remaining blind to conflicts that would be read-
ily apparent based on even a cursory conflict check, while further
encouraging commercial arbitrators to comply with the Code of
Ethics.
From a policy perspective, it is parties to commercial arbitra-
tion that intentionally employ this dispute resolution process,
largely for its expedience, reduced costs, and finality. To insure
that these benefits are more fully achieved, and to gain access to
this affirmative defense if ever needed in the future, parties will
seek to employ arbitrators who take the time and effort to conduct
143 For a discussion of what constitutes a reasonable investigation, see supra Part I.A.
144 This scheme also encourages arbitrators to conduct investigations and disclose all
known conflicts, while not expanding the scope of the FAA. See supra note 46 and accompany-
ing text; supra text accompanying note 52.
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reasonable conflict investigations. It is these arbitrators who will
uncover potential conflicts and make full disclosures, thus limiting
the opportunity for later challenges and making their services that
much more desirable. As demand for these arbitrators grows, oth-
ers who provide arbitration services will be forced to follow suit
and also conduct conflict investigations. Eventually the market
demand for arbitrators that conduct reasonable investigations and
make full disclosure of all known conflicts will result in changes
to the supply of arbitration services, as those people who serve as
arbitrators will take greater pains to assure the future integrity of
any arbitration award they hand down.
CONCLUSION
Courts have struggled to clearly define the standards by which
an arbitrator's undisclosed conflict of interest will warrant the va-
cating of an arbitration award. Furthermore, there has been a lin-
gering debate over whether an arbitrator must investigate potential
conflicts and whether an arbitrator can be evidently partial while
lacking actual knowledge of the conflict that suggests possible
bias. This proposed test for evaluating evident partiality claims
would effectively resolve the inconsistency found in prior judicial
determinations. Also, the introduction of an affirmative defense
would promote arbitrator investigations and provide for rational
results in cases where the arbitrator lacked actual knowledge.
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